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ABSTRACT
Contextual bandit algorithms (CBAs) often rely on personal data to provide recommendations. This means that
potentially sensitive data from past interactions are utilized to provide personalization to end-users. Using a local
agent on the user’s device protects the user’s privacy, by keeping the data locally, however, the agent requires
longer to produce useful recommendations, as it does not leverage feedback from other users.
This paper proposes a technique we call Privacy-Preserving Bandits (P2B), a system that updates local agents
by collecting feedback from other agents in a differentially-private manner. Comparisons of our proposed
approach with a non-private, as well as a fully-private (local) system, show competitive performance on both
synthetic benchmarks and real-world data. Specifically, we observed a decrease of 2.6% and 3.6% in multi-label
classification accuracy, and a CTR increase of 0.0025 in online advertising for a privacy budget  ≈ 0.693. These
results suggest P2B is an effective approach to problems arising in on-device privacy-preserving personalization.
1 INTRODUCTION
Personalization is the practice of tailoring a service to in-
dividual users by leveraging their interests, profile, and
content-related information. For example, a personalized
news service would learn to recommend news articles based
on past articles the user has interacted with. Contextual Ban-
dit Algorithms (Li et al., 2010; Ronen et al., 2016) are fre-
quently the workhorse of such personalized services. CBAs
improve the quality of recommendations by dynamically
adapting to users’ interests and requirements. The overall
goal of the agent in this setting is to learn a policy that
maximizes user engagement through time. In doing so,
the agent collects potentially sensitive information about
a user’s interests and past interactions, a fact that raises
privacy concerns.
On-device recommendation addresses privacy concerns,
arising from the processing of users’ past interactions, by
storing and processing any user feedback locally. As no
personal data leaves the user’s device, this approach natu-
rally maintains a user’s privacy1. However, the on-device
approach is detrimental to personalization, as it fails to incor-
porate useful information gleaned from other users, limiting
its utility in making new recommendations and leading to
1Queen Mary University of London (this work was done dur-
ing my internship at Brave software), 2Brave Software, 3Imperial
College London. Correspondence to: Mohammad Malekzadeh
<m.malekzadeh@qmul.ac.uk>.
1In a practical setting, the service maintainer still needs to do
extra work to eliminate potential side channels attacks.
the cold-start problem, where the quality of initial recom-
mendations is often insufficient for real-life deployment.
Privacy-preserving data analysis techniques such as the
Encode-Shuffle-Analyze (ESA) scheme implemented in
PROCHLO (Bittau et al., 2017) promise to safeguard user
privacy, while preserving the quality of resulting recommen-
dations, through a combination of cryptographic, trusted
hardware, and statistical techniques. In this paper, we ex-
plore the question of how this approach can be used in a
distributed personalization system to balance the quality of
the received recommendations with maintaining the privacy
of users.
This paper proposes P2B—Privacy-Preserving Bandits—a
system where individual agents running locally on users’ de-
vices are able to contribute useful feedback to other agents
through centralized model updates while providing differen-
tial privacy guarantees (Dwork & Roth, 2013). To achieve
this, P2B combines a CBA agent running locally on a user’s
device with a privacy-preserving data collection scheme
similar to ESA.
Specifically, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Problem encoding. We propose simple methods of
efficiently encoding feedback instances of a contextual
bandit problem on the user’s device. The encoding
process combines simple clustering algorithms such
as k-means, with the favorable spatial structure of nor-
malized contexts. We study the effects of this structure
on both privacy and utility, and experimentally demon-
strate how this encoding approach is competitive with
methods that do not take privacy under consideration.
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• Privacy analysis. We examine the trade-offs between
recommendation quality and privacy loss in the sys-
tem by performing a differential privacy analysis of
our proposal according to the crowd-blending privacy
model (Gehrke et al., 2012). Our analysis proves that
P2B results in a small  value, which can be directly
quantified from the probability of an agent participating
in the data collection mechanism. This demonstrates
mathematically that P2B provides a concrete and desir-
able privacy guarantee.
• Experimental results. We construct a testbed for the
evaluation of our approach where our proposal is eval-
uated on synthetic and real-world data. We include
results on a synthetic benchmark, multi-label classifi-
cation, and online advertising data. Our results experi-
mentally demonstrate that P2B remains competitive in
terms of predictive utility with approaches that provide
no privacy protections. At the same time, it substan-
tially outperforms on-device cold-start models that do
not share data2.
2 BACKGROUND
Contextual bandit algorithms present a principled approach
that addresses the exploration-exploitation dilemma in dy-
namic environments, while utilizing additional, contextual
information. In the contextual bandit setting, at time t the
agent selects an action at ∈ {1, 2, . . . , A} based on the ob-
served d-dimensional context vector xt at that time. The
agent then obtains the reward rt,a ∈ [0, 1] associated with
the selected action, without observing the rewards associ-
ated with alternative actions.
Upper confidence bound (UCB) methods operate by com-
puting upper bounds on the plausible rewards of each arm
and consequently selecting the arm with the highest bound.
In the implemented P2B, we use LinUCB (Chu et al., 2011),
which computes UCB based on a linear combination of re-
wards encountered on previous rounds to propose the next
action. In LinUCB the exploration-exploitation actions de-
pend on α ≥ 0, which is the parameter controlling that
trade-off.
In the following we provide some preliminary material on
privacy preserving data release mechanisms in relation to
personalization with contextual bandits.
2.1 Differential Privacy Preliminaries
In the differential privacy framework (Dwork & Roth, 2013)
a data sharing mechanism violates its users privacy if data
analysis can reveal if a user is included in the data with a
degree of confidence higher than the mechanism’s bound.
2Code and data are available at: https://github.com/
mmalekzadeh/privacy-preserving-bandits
Definition 1: Differentially-Private Data Sharing. Given
, δ ≥ 0, we say a data sharing mechanism M satisfies
(, δ)−differential privacy if for all pair of neighbor datasets
of context vectors X,X′ differing in only one context vector
x and for all R ⊂ Range(M),
Pr[M(X) ∈ R] ≤ ePr[M(X′) ∈ R] + δ
2.2 Crowd-blending
Crowd-blending privacy model (Gehrke et al., 2012) is a
relaxation of differential privacy. In the crowd-blending
framework a user u blends with a number l ≥ 1 of users in a
way that replacing the user’s data with any other individual
in this crowd does not alter the results of statistical queries.
A necessary condition for this approach is the existence
of l − 1 other users that blend with user u. If the data
does not contain a sufficient number of other individuals the
mechanism essentially ignores user u’s data. Consequently
an encoding mechanismM(·) that satisfies crowd-blending
privacy (Gehrke et al., 2012) can be formalized as follows:
Definition 2: Crowd-Blending Encoding. Given
l ≥ 1, we say an encoding mechanism M satisfies
(l, ¯ = 0)−crowd-blending privacy if for every context vec-
tor x and for every context dataset X = X′ ∪ {x} we have∣∣∣{y ∈M(X) : y =M({x})}∣∣∣ ≥ l or M(X) =M(X′)
where
∣∣{·}∣∣ denotes the size of a set3.
This means that for every context vector x, either its encoded
value y blends in a crowd of l−1 other values in the released
dataset, or the mechanism ignores x. In this setting, ¯ = 0
means that ifM(·) releases an encoded value y for a given
x, it should be exactly the same as other l − 1 encoded
values coming from other l − 1 context vectors x′. An
(, δ)-differentially private mechanism also satisfies (l, , δ)-
crowd-blending privacy for every integer l ≥ 1 (Gehrke
et al., 2012).
An important aspect of crowd-blending privacy is that if
a random pre-sampling is used during data collection, be-
fore applying the crowd-blending on the collected data, the
combined pipeline provides zero-knowledge (Gehrke et al.,
2011) privacy and thus differential privacy (Dwork & Roth,
2013) as well. This intuitively says that if a user u blends
in a crowd of l users, then users similar to u can easily take
place of u. Therefore, user u being sampled or not being
sampled has a negligible effect on the final output of the
combined mechanism.
2.3 Differentially-private Data Collection
Privacy-preserving data collection has numerous applica-
tions. To collect browser settings data, Google has built
3Note that X′ can be any context dataset not including x.
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RAPPOR into the Chrome browser (Erlingsson et al., 2014).
RAPPOR considers data to be shared as a string and hashes
it into Bloom filters using some hash functions. It then ran-
domizes the Bloom filter, that is a binary vector, and uses it
as the permanent data to generate instantaneous randomized
response for sharing with the server. RAPPOR can be used
to collect some aggregated statistics over the product users.
For example, having a huge number of users, RAPPOR can
be used for estimating the most frequent values, e.g. the
most frequent homepage URLs. However, since the shared
data is only useful for estimating aggregated statistics like
mean or frequency, the utility of every single shared data
for training a model is often too low —- the accuracy of the
private data becomes unacceptable even with a large number
of users.
As an extension to RAPPOR, ESA architecture (Bittau et al.,
2017) adds two more layers to the LDP layer, called shuf-
fler and analyzer, that are aimed to obscure the identity
of the data owner through oblivious shuffling with trusted
hardware. The Shuffler in the ESA architecture eliminates
all metadata attached to the users’ reports to eliminate the
possibility of linking a data report to a single user during
data collection. However, if users do not want to trust any
other party, the provided privacy will be the same as the
RAPPOR.
3 METHODOLOGY
In P2B, every user runs their own CBA agent that works in-
dependent of any other agents. At time t the agent observes
the current context xt, proposes an action at, and conse-
quently observes the reward rt,a associated with the action.
As the interaction proceeds locally, we refer to agents run-
ning on a user’s device as local agents. The agent may
periodically elect to send some observed interaction to a
data collection server. Using the collected data, the server
updates a central model that is then propagated back to the
users.
Figure 1 summarizes the overall architecture of the pro-
posed framework. The rest of this section presents P2B’s
operation and details its various components. Section 4 de-
scribes why P2B satisfies differential privacy, and Section 5
experimentally demonstrates how this approach improves
the performance of local agents.
3.1 Randomized Data Reporting
Local agents participate in P2B through a randomized par-
ticipation mechanism. After some interactions with the
user, T ≥ 1, the local agent may randomly construct a pay-
load containing an encoded instance of interaction data with
probability p. Randomized participation is crucial step in
two ways. First, it raises the difficulty of re-identification
attacks by randomizing the timing of recorded interactions.
More crucially, the participation probability p as a source of
randomness, has a direct effect on the differential privacy
parameters  and δ we will establish in Section 4. Briefly,
by choosing the appropriate participation probability, one
can achieve any level of desired privacy guarantee in P2B.
3.2 Encoding
The agent encodes an instance of the context prior to data
transmission. The encoding step acts as a function that
maps a d-dimensional context vector x into a code y ∈
{0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, where k is the total number of encoded
contexts. Agents encode context as normalized vectors of
fixed precision, using q digits for each entry in the vector.
An example of this representation approach is normalized
histogram, where entries in the histogram sum to 1 and
are represented to a precision of q decimal digits. This
combination of normalization and finite precision has two
important characteristics.
First, it is possible to precisely enumerate all possible con-
texts according to the stars and bars pattern in combina-
torics (Benjamin & Quinn, 2011). Specifically the cardinal-
ity n of the set of normalized context vectors x ∈ X, using
a finite precision of q decimal digits is
n =
(
10q + d− 1
d− 1
)
. (1)
Secondly, sample points in the normalized vector space
are distributed uniformly in a grid shape. Given that the
agent tends to propose similar actions for similar contexts,
neighboring context vectors x can be encoded into the same
context code y. While this approach may appear to be lim-
iting, it is generalizes to other instances where the context
vectors are bounded and exhibit some degree of clustered
structure.
Figure 2, provides a concrete example of the encoding pro-
cess on a 3-dimensional vector space being encoded in 6
different codes. The cardinality of the encoding, is impor-
tant in establishing a desired utility-privacy trade off. The
encoding algorithm can be chosen depending on application
requirements, but we limited our experimental evaluation to
the simple k-means clustering (Sculley, 2010).
After electing to participate and encoding an instance of a
user interaction, the agent transmits the data in the form of
the tuple (yt, at, rt,a) to the shuffler.
3.3 Shuffler
The trusted shuffler is a critical part of every ESA architec-
ture (Bittau et al., 2017), and in our P2B it is necessary in
ensuring anonymization and crowd-blending. Following the
same PROCHLO implementation (Bittau et al., 2017), the
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Figure 1. System architecture for P2B.
Figure 2. Normalized vector space of x = (x1,x2,x3) with q = 1
and cardinality n = 66. Size of the circles shows the value of
x3. Rectangles show a sample encoding of the vector space with
k = 6 and minimum cluster size l = 9.
shuffler operates in a secure enclave on trusted hardware
and performs three tasks:
1. Anonymization: eliminating all the received meta-
data (e.g. IP address) originating from local agents.
2. Shuffling: gathering tuples received from different
sources into batches and shuffling their order.
3. Thresholding: removing tuples whose their encoded
context vector frequency in the batch is less than a
defined threshold.
After performing these three operations, the shuffler sends
the refined batch to the a server for updating the model.
Upon receiving the new batch of training data, the server
updates the global model based on the observed interaction
data and distributes it to local agents that request it.
4 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
This section analyzes how P2B ensures differential privacy,
through a combination of pre-sampling and crowd-blending.
As context vectors are multi-dimensional real-valued vec-
tors, we assume a context vector in its original form can
be uniquely assigned to a specific user. P2B assumes no
prior on the possible values for a context vector, meaning
context vectors are coming from a uniform distribution over
the underlying vector space. With these assumptions and
the provided zero-knowledge privacy, P2B resists against
strong adversaries with any kind of prior knowledge or side
information.
For the n different context vectors in Equation (1), the opti-
mal encoder (Section 3.2) encodes every n/k of them into
one of the possible k codes. Consequently, when a total
number of U users participate in P2B to sends a tuple to the
server, the optimal encoder satisfies crowd-blending privacy
with l = U/k. In the case of a suboptimal encoder, we
consider l as the size of the smallest cluster in the vector
space. Furthermore, situations where the number of users
is small, leading to a small l, can be addressed by adjusting
the shufflers threshold to reach the desired l. Essentially, l
can always be matched to the shuffler’s threshold.
Each user randomly participates in data sharing, transmit-
ting a data tuple with probability p (Section 3.1), and then
encoding the pre-sampled data. Following (Gehrke et al.,
2012), the combination of pre-sampling with probability p
and (l, ¯)−crowd-blending, leads to a differentially private
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Figure 3.  as a result of the probability of participating in the
scheme p.
mechanism with
 = ln
(
p·
(2− p
1− pe
¯
)
+
(
1−p)) and δ = e−Ω(l·(1−p)2).
(2)
Where Ω is a constant that can be calculated based on the
analysis provided by (Gehrke et al., 2012).
Our encoding scheme provides an ¯ = 0 for crowd-blending,
as the encoded values for all the members of a crowd is
exactly the same. As a consequence, the  parameter of the
differential privacy of the entire data sharing mechanism
depends entirely on the probability p of participation as
(Figure 3):
 = ln
(
p ·
(2− p
1− p
)
+
(
1− p)) . (3)
For example by trading half of the potential data (p = 0.5)
P2B achieves an  ≈ 0.693 that is a strong privacy guar-
antee. On the other hand, the δ depends on both p and l.
To understand the effect of δ, Dwork et al. (Dwork & Roth,
2013) prove that an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism
ensures that for all neighboring datasets, the absolute value
of the privacy loss will be bounded by  with probability
at least 1− δ. Therefore, by linearly increasing the crowd-
blending parameter l, we can exponentially reduce the δ
parameter.
5 EXPRIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section explores P2B’s privacy-utility trade-offs com-
pared to competing non-private and completely private ap-
proaches. The experimental evaluation assumes the standard
bandit setting, where the local agent learns a policy based on
the contextual Linear Upper Confidence Bound algorithm
(LinUCB) (Chu et al., 2011; Li et al., 2010). For simplicity,
throughout the experiments, the probability p of random-
ized transmission by a local agent was set to p = 0.5, the
rounding parameter q of the encoder was set to q = 1, and
the parameter α for LinUCB was set to α = 1, meaning
that the local agent is equally likely to propose an explo-
ration or exploitation action. The experiments compare the
performance of the following three settings:
Cold. The local agent learns a policy without any commu-
nication to the server at any point. As there is no communi-
cation this provides full privacy, but each agent has to learn
a policy from a cold-start.
Warm and Non-Private. In this setting, local agents com-
municate the observed context to the server in its original
form. Thus, other agents are able to initialize their policy
with a model received from the server and start adapting it to
their local environment. This is called warm and non-private
start, and represents the other end of the privacy/utility spec-
trum with no privacy afforded to the users.
Warm and Private In this setting, local agents communi-
cate with the server using P2B. Once more, other agents
initialize their internal policy with an updated model re-
ceived from the server and start to adapt it to their local
environment. We term this a warm and private start, and
the provided privacy guarantees function according to the
analysis in section 4.
These approaches are evaluated on synthetic benchmarks,
two multi-label classification datasets, and an online adver-
tising dataset.
5.1 Synthetic Preference Benchmark
These benchmarks consider the setting where there’s a
stochastic function F that relates context vectors with the
probability of a proposed action receiving a reward. Specifi-
cally, F is the scaled softmax output of a matrix-vector prod-
uct of the user preferences with a randomly generated weight
matrix W . We set the mean reward r¯t,a for a proposed ac-
tion at given context vector xt as r¯t,a = βf (i)(x) + z,
where f (i) is the ith component of softmax applied on Wxt,
β is a scaling factor with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, and z is a random
Gaussian noise z ∼ N (0, σ2).
For all synthetic benchmarks the parameters where set as
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follows. The scaling factor for the preference function was
fixed to β = 0.1 and the variance of the Gaussian noise
σ2 = 0.01. In terms of local agent settings, the agents use
k = 210 codes for encoding purposes and observe T = 10
local interactions before randomly transmitting an instance
with probability p = 0.5. We varied the number of dimen-
sions d of the context vector in the range of 5 to 20, and
the number of actions in the range of 10 to 50. We observe
the average reward in each setting as the user population U
grows from 102 to 106.
Our results in Figure 4 indicate that for a small number
of interactions the cold start local model fails to learn a
useful policy. By contrast, the warm models substantially
improve as more user data becomes available. Utilizing
prior interaction data in this setting, more than doubles
the effectiveness of the learned policies, even for relatively
small user populations. Overall, the non-private agents have
a performance advantage, with the private version trailing.
Figure 5 illustrates how the dimensionality of the context
vector affects the agent’s expected reward. By increasing d
from 6 to 20 the average reward decreases as agents spend
more time exploring the larger context space. P2B remains
competitive with its non-private counterparts, and on oc-
casion outperforms them, especially for low-dimensional
context settings. The number of actions has a similar ef-
fect to the dimensionality of the context, as agents have
to spend more time exploring suboptimal actions. Once
more, the results of Figure 4 indicate that this is the case
experimentally.
5.2 Multi-Label Classification
These experiments examine the performance of the differ-
ent approaches on multi-label classification with bandit
feedback. We consider two datasets, namely (1) Medi-
aMill (Snoek et al., 2006), a video classification dataset
including 43,907 instances, 120 extracted features from each
video, and 101 possible categories, and (2) a TextMining
dataset (Srivastava & Zane-Ulman, 2005) including 28,596
instances, 500 extracted features from each text, and 22
possible categories.
P2B’s performance in this setting was evaluated according
to the following setting. We consider a fixed number of
local agents. Each agent has access to, and is able to interact
with a small fraction of the dataset. In particular every agent
has access to up to 100 samples, which were randomly
selected without replacement from the entire dataset. 70%
of agents to participate in P2B and we test the accuracy
of the resulting models with the remaining 30%. For both
datasets, the local agents use k = 25 codes for encoding
purposes.
This setting is particularly interesting as it allows us to
Figure 4. Synthetic Benchmarks: (Top) A = 10, (Middle) A = 20
(Bottom) A = 50. For all: d = 10 and T = 10. The expected
reward in this setting has a strong dependence on number of arms as
agents will spend considerable time exploring alternative actions.
study how the predictive performance of the system changes
when the local agents interact more with the user. In terms
of relative performance between the different approaches,
the results in Figure 6 repeat the findings of the synthetic
benchmarks. The non-private warm version is better than
the private warm version, which is still better than the cold
version that utilizes only local feedback. However, we can
also observe that the cold version given enough interactions
produces increasingly improving results. The centralized
update mechanism tends to have a multiplicative effect,
especially when there is little local interaction data before
reaching a plateau.
5.3 Online Advertising
Here, we consider an advertisement recommendation sce-
nario where the action is to recommend an ad from one of
the existing categories. We use a Criteo dataset from a Kag-
gle contest4. It consists of a portion of Criteo’s traffic over
a period of 7 days, including 13 numerical features and 26
4https://labs.criteo.com/category/dataset/
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Figure 5. U = 20000, A = 20, T = 20, and d = {6, 7, . . . , 20}.
As the dimensionality of the context increases the average reward
for this settings is reduced as agents spend more time trying to
explore their environment.
categorical features. For each record in the dataset there
is a label that shows whether the user has clicked on the
recommended ad or not. The feature semantics are unknown
and the data publisher has hashed the values of categorical
features into 32 bits for anonymization purposes.
As the exact semantics of the features were not disclosed,
we assume that numerical features represent user’s context
and categorical features correspond to the type of the pro-
posed product. For each sample in the dataset, we hash the
values of the 26 categorical features into an integer value.
The resulting integer value is then used as possible product
category to recommend. The hashing procedure operates as
follows: First, the 26 categorical values are reduced into a
single hashed value using feature hashing (Weinberger et al.,
2009). After hashing, the 40 most frequent hash codes are
selected. These are converted into an integer value in the
range between 1 to 40, based on their frequency (label 1
shows the most frequent code and so on). Finally, for evalu-
ation we only use data samples having one of this 40 values
as the product label and ignore the remaining data.
During evaluation, the local agent observes the values of
the numerical features as the context vector, and in response
takes one of the 40 possible actions. The agent obtains
a reward of 1, if the proposed action matches the logged
action, and the logged action is clicked through.
The remaining experimental setup for the criteo dataset is
similar to the one used in the multi-label datasets. Specifi-
cally, we present experimental results (Figure 7) for d=10
and total number of actionsA = 40. We compare the results
for two values of encoding parameter k = 25 and k = 27.
The sampling probability p remains 0.5, and the shuffling
threshold remains 10. This experimental setting has 3,000
agents, and each of the agents accumulates 300 interactions.
The results in this setting are quite surprising as private
agents attain a better click-through rate than their non-
private counterparts. There is a recent work (Nasr et al.,
2018) showing that privacy-preserving training of machine
Figure 6. Multi-Label Dataset accuracy: (Top) Media-Mill with
d = 20 and A = 40 (Bottom) Text-Mining with d = 20 and
A = 20. As local agents observe more interactions they obtain
better accuracy. This has a multiplicative effect in the distributed
settings where agents reach to the plateau much faster.
learning models can aid generalization as well as protect
privacy. There are some factors we believe help explain
these experimental results.
Private agents use the encoded value as the context. As
a result, the number of possible contexts is much smaller
compared to using the original d-dimensional context vec-
tor. As contextual bandits need to balance exploration with
exploitation, especially in the early stages, a bandit with a
smaller context size can quickly reach better results. Fur-
thermore, P2B clusters similar context vectors into the same
categories and this also helps a private bandit to better act in
similar situations. This is an effect that also can be seen for
the lower dimensional contexts of the synthetic benchmarks
(Figure 5).
6 RELATED WORK
User data fuels a variety of useful machine learning applica-
tions, but at the same time comes with a number of ethical
and legal considerations. The quest to balance the seemingly
conflicting concerns of privacy and utility have shaped the
resurgence of distributed machine learning approaches that
safeguard the privacy of user data. This section compares
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Figure 7. Criteo results. d = 10, A = 40, (Top) k = 25, and
(Bottom) k = 27. The private and non-private agents obtain
similar performances for low numbers of local interactions. As the
number of local interactions increase the private agents perform
better than their non-private counterparts.
P2B to some recent proposals in this area.
On-device inference ensures that data does not need to leave
the device for inference, which is an important step towards
protecting privacy. Federated learning techniques extend
this approach to doing on device training through the idea
of “bringing the code to the data, instead of the data to
the code”. (Bonawitz et al., 2019) proposes and evaluates
a high-level system to perform federated learning across
devices with varying availability. Their proposal relies on
secure aggregation (Bonawitz et al., 2017; McMahan &
Ramage, 2017) to ensure that user’s data remain encrypted
even in the server’s memory.
Compared to P2B, federated learning is substantially more
complicated in terms of orchestration. Relying on a local
model training procedure, puts some overhead on the user’s
device and there is substantial communication complex-
ity involved in communicating model updates and training
batching. By contrast, P2B puts almost no overhead on
user’s devices as they only need to run a distance preserving
encoding algorithm (Sculley, 2010; Aghasaryan et al., 2013)
that has theO(kd) complexity at the inference time, and any
data exchange happens opportunistically, without requiring
any synchronization between clients.
The “Draw and Discard” machine learning system described
in (Pihur et al., 2018) is an interesting combination of the
approach of bringing the code to the data, with differen-
tial privacy guarantees. The proposed system encompasses
decentralized model training, for generalized linear mod-
els, and maintains k instances of the model at the server
side. The draw and discard approach consists of two com-
ponents: On the server side, it sends a randomly chosen
model instance to the client. Upon receiving an updated
model instance, the server randomly replaces it with one of
the k existing instances. On the user side, users update the
linear model on their data, and add Laplacian noise to the
model parameters to satisfy differential privacy. Their pri-
vacy analysis is in the feature-level that assumes features of
the model are all uncorrelated. As a consequence, for achiev-
ing model-level privacy, where most features are correlated
to each other, substantially more noise needs to be added
to the updated model before sending it to the server. P2B
does not make any assumption on the correlation among
context vector features and it provides a constant and similar
privacy guarantee across all the users. Our experiments only
consider situations where users participate by sending only
one data tuple. However, in the case of collecting r data
tuple from each user, because of the composition property
of the provided differential privacy (Dwork & Roth, 2013),
P2B still guarantees (r)-differential privacy.
Shariff et al. (Shariff & Sheffet, 2018) discuss that adhering
to the standard notion of differential privacy needs to ignore
the context and thus incur linear regret. Thus, they use a
relaxed notion of DP, called Joint Differential Privacy, that
allows to use the non-privatized data at time t , while guaran-
teeing that all interactions with all other users at timepoints
t′ > t have very limited dependence on that user t data. Our
approach guarantees differential privacy to all users, inde-
pendent of time of participation in P2B. Basu et al. (Basu
et al., 2019) argue that if a centralized bandit algorithm only
observes a privatized version of the sequence of user’s ac-
tions and responses, based on -LDP, the algorithm’s regret
scales as a multiplicative factor . Other LDP mechanisms
proposed for bandits algorithms (Tossou & Dimitrakakis,
2017; Gajane et al., 2018) consider a situations where only
responses are considered to be private without incorporating
contextual information in the learning process.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents P2B, a privacy-preserving approach for
machine learning with contextual bandits. We show experi-
mentally that standalone agents trained on an individual’s
data require a substantial amount of time to learn a useful
recommendation policy. Our experiments show that sharing
data between agents can substantially reduce the number of
required local interactions in order to reach a useful local
policy.
We introduced a simple distributed system for updating
agents based on user interactions. In a series of experiments,
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P2B shows substantial improvement for increasing num-
bers of users and local interactions. With regards to P2B’s
privacy, experiments demonstrate the clustering-based en-
coding scheme is effective in encoding interactions. In
addition, all the experiments relied on a sampling proba-
bility p = 0.5. This results in a very competitive privacy
budget of  ≈ 0.693.
Given that P2B essentially discards half of the data for the
sake of privacy, the system performs surprisingly well. In
the synthetic benchmarks, P2B traces a similar trend to its
non-private counterpart. While for large populations the non-
private agents have an advantage there are more than a few
cases where their private counterparts are competitive and
even outperform them. Additionally, as the multi-label clas-
sification experiments (Figure 6) indicate, the performance
gap between the non-private and differentially-private set-
tings seems to be shrinking to within 3.6% and 2.6% for
the text mining and MediaMill tasks respectively. P2B’s
performance on the Criteo dataset is a rare instance where
a privacy preserving regime actually improves generaliza-
tion. The resulting CTR difference of 0.0025 in favor or the
privacy preserving approach is somewhat surprising. We do
provide reasons as to why this is not completely unexpected
in our evaluation of results.
Overall, P2B represents a simple approach to perform
privacy-preserving personalization. Our results indicate
that P2B becomes a particularly viable option for settings
where large user populations participate in a large amount
of local interactions, where the performance penalty for pri-
vacy is vanishingly small. As future work, we aim to study
the behavior of more encoding approaches as well as their
interplay with alternative contextual bandit algorithms.
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